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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporation law provides to shareholders a degree of fiduciary
protection. Under proper circumstances, the shareholder is pro-
tected from the acts of his fellow shareholders and the corporate
directors. This Article defines the circumstances in which fiduciary
duties to corporate shareholders arise, to the extent that this is
possible within the state of the law today, and determines the di-
rection of the law concerning fiduciary relationships within the cor-
porate family.
The examination of this subject is timely. Four well-known deci-
sions within the last few years have considered the subject and
have thrown some light on it. Smith v. Van Gorkom,' Moran v.
* Professor of Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, Memphis State University; A.B.,
Lake Forest College, 1943; LL.B., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1950; M.A., Lake Forest
College, 1979.
1. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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Household International, Inc.,2 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings,3 and ConAgra v. Cargill4 considered some of the
circumstances in which directors owe a direct fiduciary duty to
shareholders, a subject that has previously been treated somewhat
enigmatically by the courts. Although courts commonly speak of a
fiduciary duty of directors to the corporation and its shareholders,
one is hard pressed to find a case in which directors are held di-
rectly liable to shareholders, absent circumstances that create a
special relationship.
The scope of this Article, however, includes a consideration of all
instances of fiduciary duty to shareholders, not simply those run-
ning from director to shareholder. The Article, therefore, deter-
mines the corporate capacities in which individuals incur fiduciary
responsibilities and to whom such responsibilities run.
The term fiduciary duty is generally considered to mean a duty,
implied in law, of "the finest loyalty"' to another party in certain
relationships. A great deal has been written on the nature of fiduci-
ary duties in a corporate setting, but surprisingly little has been
said about to whom the duties run. Justice Frankfurter once
stated:
We completely agree with the Commission that officers and
directors who manage a holding company in process of reorgani-
zation under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935
occupy positions of trust .... But to say that a man is a fiduci-
2. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
3. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
4. 222 Neb. 136, 382 N.W.2d 576 (1986).
5. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928). Although this
definition arose in a joint venture rather than a corporate setting, it has been cited to de-
scribe the fiduciary relationships between parties to trusts, partnerships, and corporations.
Implicitly, therefore, courts have recognized that the nature of fiduciary duty is the same no
matter where it is found. Differences arise, however, with respect to the identity of the spe-
cific duties and to whom they are owed. Even the court in Meinhard recognized tbat differ-
ent fiduciary responsibilities derive from different business relationships. The dissent by
Justice Andrews drew a distinction between the fiduciary duties of partners and those of
joint venturers. Id. at 476-77, 164 N.E. at 553 (Andrews, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Car-
dozo, who wrote the majority opinion, distinguished between the duties of the managing
coadventurer and those of the other coadventurers when in speaking of Mr. Salmon he said,
"He was much more than a coadventurer. He was a managing coadventurer.... For him
and for those like him, the rule of undivided loyalty is relentless and supreme .... " Id. at
468, 164 N.E. at 548 (citations omitted).
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ary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To
whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fidu-
ciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obliga-
tions? And what are the consequences of his deviation from
duty?'
As perceived by Justice Frankfurter, judicial analysis of fiduci-
ary relationships is often incomplete. But even Justice Frank-
furter's opinion failed to recognize an important factor in a com-
prehensive analysis of the duties owed by a fiduciary. For although
few would argue with Frankfurter's conclusion that officers and di-
rectors occupy a position of trust, or the contention of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission reported in the same opinion that
corporate management owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation's
shareholders,7 no attempt has been made to specify the exact func-
tion from which this duty arose, and before one can answer any of
Justice Frankfurter's questions, one must first determine whether
the fiduciary responsibilities of director, officer, and shareholder
differ in any respect. If they do, one must then determine from
which of these capacities the fiduciary duties in a particular case
are said to arise."
The law's reluctance to recognize the distinction between the fi-
duciary responsibilities of officers, directors, and shareholders is
perhaps not surprising. Until recent years the practice was to
choose most directors from among the officers, and at an earlier
time-even today in close corporations-individuals with large
shareholdings were actually in control. As a consequence, perhaps
saying that management occupied a fiduciary position was suffi-
cient. Today, however, that concept may be too simplistic.
6. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
7. Id. at 87.
8. In another United States Supreme Court case, Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939),
often cited in articles on this subject, Justice Douglas wrote that "a director is a fiduciary
.... So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders.... Their powers
are powers in trust." Id. at 306 (citations omitted). This case concerned a creditor's action
to overcome the machinations of a controlling shareholder attempting to avoid payment of a
corporate obligation by creating a prior claim against the assets of a bankrupt corporation.
In this case the shareholder was found liable to the corporation for having exercised control
in his own interests and contrary to the interests of the corporation.
1988]
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IL THE SCOPE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE CORPORATE SETTING
It is beyond dispute that fiduciary duty arises only where power
exists, and one thesis of this Article is that in the formula used to
determine an individual's fiduciary duty, the concept of fiduciary
responsibility is the constant, whereas the existence of power is the
variable. The extent of fiduciary duty must be commensurate with
the power to act. The great majority of decided cases can be un-
derstood by analysis on this basis.9
The fiduciary duty of corporate directors has long been recog-
nized.10 It consists, in general, of the duty of the director to give
attention to the interests of the corporation, and to give them pri-
ority, even against his personal interests, in his functioning as a
director. This is the same duty an agent owes his principal and a
partner owes his copartner in their respective functions.
To the extent that a difference exists between corporate officer,
agent, and partner on the one hand, and the director on the other,
this difference does not relate to the concept of fiduciary responsi-
bility. It results, instead, from the difference in the functions of the
positions. The officer, agent, and partner are actors with either
specific or general authority within the scope of the business of the
enterprise. The director is not. His function is deliberative. For ex-
ample, generally a director may compete with the company on
whose board he sits." Such competition might diminish his desire
to discharge his deliberative function, but it will not reduce his
9. "[D]isregard of trust relationships by those whom the law should regard as fiduciaries,
are all a single seamless web ... ." Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1971) (citation omitted).
10. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1983);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301 (Supp.
1987). These statutes and others similar to them are actually a codification of the common
law on the fiduciary duty of corporate directors to their corporation.
11. This grant is not absolute. Certain limitations have been set, and certain criteria must
be met. For a general overview of these criteria, see Note, Recent Decisions, Corpora-
tions-Officers and Directors--"Corporate Opportunities" Doctrine, 50 MICH. L. REv. 471
(1952); Note, Duty of a Director Not to Compete, 26 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 116, 120-23 (1951).
For case law that illustrates the limitations, see Tovrea Land and Cattle Co. v. Linsenmeyer,
100 Ariz. 107, 121, 412 P.2d 47, 57 (1966); Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48 F.2d 236 (N.D.
Cal. 1931); Lincoln Stores v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941); Golden Rod Min-
ing Co. v. Bukvich, 108 Mont. 569, 92 P.2d 316 (1939); New York Auto. Co. v. Franklin, 49
Misc. 8, 97 N.Y.S. 781 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1905); Barr v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 51 F. 33
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1892), affd, 57 F. 86 (3d Cir. 1893).
[Vol. 29:823
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ability to do so. In contrast, an agent generally may not compete
with his principal within the scope of the agency. 12 Acting in com-
petition with the principal would certainly be inconsistent with the
obligation to act in the principal's interest within the scope of his
business.
The strictness of the fiduciary obligation of loyalty of corporate
directors has been ameliorated to some extent by statute and by
the courts. Undoubtedly, at one time any contract between a cor-
poration and one of its directors or an organization in which he
had an interest that was not insubstantial was voidable by the cor-
poration, as would be the case in a contract between principal and
agent. Although this may still be true between principal and agent,
it is not true with respect to directors. 13 Today the subject is gen-
erally treated by state statutes, which usually deny the corporation
the right to void a fair agreement, 4 although most of them place
the burden of establishing fairness on the director who is ostensi-
bly in conflict with the corporation.
Such contracts exist in many familiar forms. An often recurring
example is found among the large public-issue corporations, whose
boards of directors include executives of other large corporations.
In such circumstances transactions between the corporation of
which the director is an employee and the corporation of which he
is a director occur from time to time, and, except in egregious cir-
cumstances, do not constitute violations of any reasonable concep-
tion of fiduciary duty.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393 (1958).
13. Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus.
LAW. 35 (1966). This article gives an historical perspective on the conflict of interest prob-
lem. At one time a contract between a corporation and its directors was voidable by the
shareholders. Now their validation is not required because the courts themselves will look at
the contract and decide its fairness without shareholders' approval. This article traces the
history of this change in corporate law.
14. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a) (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1983); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8:60 (Smith-Hurd 1985); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 713 (McKinney
1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-302 (Supp. 1987). The Delaware statute puts no burden of
proving fairness on the interested directors; it provides only that the transaction be a fair
one. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (a)(3) (1983). Delaware case law, however, provides that
once the shareholders have established that the procedures of the statutes were not fol-
lowed, the directors have the burden of proving the fairness of the transaction. See Fliegler
v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 177,
91 A.2d 57 (1952).
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Under long-established law, directors may not divert to them-
selves corporate opportunities,15 just as the agent or partner may
not divert to himself opportunities of his principal or copartner.16
Corporate opportunities have been variously defined. In many
older cases, they were defined as "property wherein the corpora-
tion has an interest already existing, or in which it has an expec-
tancy growing out of an existing right, or. . . [where denial of the
opportunity to the corporation] will in some degree balk the corpo-
ration in effecting the purposes of its creation.' 7 Another court
has defined the phrase to mean opportunities in the corporation's
line of business, 8 but by far the most common understanding of
15. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 237 (3d ed. 1983).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 389, 393.
17. Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 502, 28 So. 199, 201 (1900). In
this case the corporation, which was in the business of quarrying limestone and manufactur-
ing lime, had a lease and interests in valuable quarry land. Two directors, who were also
stockholders, procured a third party to purchase the interests in the land from its owners in
the name of the directors. The directors had full knowledge of their corporation's interest in
the property. The court ordered the directors to hold the land in trust for the corporation.
Id. at 499, 28 So. at 200-01. In another early case, McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 F. 103
(8th Cir. 1906), the corporation ran two theaters held under leases. One of the directors
formed a new corporation and obtained the renewal of both leases in trust, and the court
ordered the new corporation to transfer the leases to the old company. Somewhat later, in
News-Journal Corp. v. Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So. 2d 741 (1941), two tracts of land essential to
the corporation were bought by an officer of the business purely for his own interest. The
court held that the officer could not retain the benefit but instead had to hold the land in
trust for the corporation. These cases illustrate the importance the courts place on the cor-
poration's existing and expectancy interests in the property and need for the property in the
furtherance of the purpose of the company. The courts linked these interests directly to
corporate opportunity and ruled that the directors should not avail themselves of these
opportunities.
18. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). This case discusses the fact
that not all corporate opportunities in the "line of business" will subject directors to a fidu-
ciary duty to the corporation. In some situations the director may not owe this duty; for
example, if the director is approached in an individual capacity, if the nature of the oppor-
tunity is not essential to the company, or if the corporation has no interest or expectancy in
the opportunity. See also Maclary v. Pleasant Hills, 35 Del. Ch. 39, 49-50, 109 A.2d 830, 837
(1954), a stockholder derivative action challenging a transaction. The defendant corporation,
a family-owned business, transfered real estate to its president at a price significantly below
its fair market value. The land was owned by the corporation, which was in the business of
renting and selling real estate. The president made improvements on the lots, and the court
ruled that the president should pay to the corporation the difference in value for the land
rather than reconvey because the president controlled the corporation. The president had
availed himself of a corporate opportunity and the corporation was entitled to the benefit
received by the president.
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the doctrine today is the subjective idea that directors may not
unfairly divert to themselves opportunities when the interest of
the corporation calls for protection. 19 One commentator has ar-
gued, however, that these alternative articulations of the corporate
opportunity doctrine are simply exercises in semantics, and that a
constructive trust for the benefit of the corporation generally will
be imposed only when property acquired by the director was nec-
essary to an existing corporate objective or when the director
abused his position by the manner in which he accomplished the
transaction. 0
In view of the fact that a partner functions as a general agent in
the conduct of a partnership business, whereas a corporate director
has no authority whatsoever to conduct the business of the corpo-
ration,, it is not surprising that the doctrine of partnership oppor-
tunity is considerably more onerous than the doctrine of corporate
opportunity. This difference results from the application of the
same fiduciary standard as is applied in the case of the corporate
director, but to a much broader range of responsibilities. It is logi-
cal, therefore, that the partnership may have the benefit of any
19. H. BALLENTINE, BALLENTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 79 (1946). The test calls for applica-
tion of fairness on a case-by-case basis. On facts similar to Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d
503, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts applied the Ballentine fairness test, rejecting the
existing corporate interest or expectancy test. Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323 Mass.
187, 199, 80 N.E.2d 522, 529 (1948). A director and officer of Durfee & Canning set up a
dummy corporation, Pacific Gas Corp., procured gas shipments for Pacific through a third
corporation, and sold the shipments to Durfee & Canning at a substantial profit. The ship-
ments could have been bought directly from the third corporation by Durfee & Canning.
The court ruled that the defendant director had to return all profits he made to Durfee &
Canning.
Later cases have used a combined test that incorporates both the "line of business" test
and the fairness test. The Supreme Court of Delaware used this combination test and stated
that the fairness aspect should be applied in consideration of the surrounding facts and
circumstances. Equity Corp. v. Milton, 43 Del. Ch. 160, 164-65, 221 A.2d 494, 497 (1966).
When a director purchased stock of his corporation, an investment company, the court ruled
that no opportunities were available to the corporation because the director had dealt with
his own property. See also Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 222 N.W.2d 71 (1974), in which
directors of family-owned corporations took advantage of related market needs and set up
different corporations over a span of time to meet and provide these needs. The court ruled
that the directors had not breached any fiduciary duty to the family corporation.
20. Note, Corporate Opportunity in the Close Corporation-A Different Result? 56 GEo.
L.J. 381, 382-83 (1967).
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transaction by a partner within the scope of the partnership
business.2
As is true of partners, the participants in a close corporation are
often general agents and have the authority to bind the corpora-
tion in the ordinary course of its business. In such case the partici-
pants should be subject to the more demanding duty of a partner,
rather than the duty of a mere director." The individual's fiduci-
ary duty should be commensurate with his authority, and the par-
ticipant in a close corporation has greater authority than the ordi-
nary director.
Allegations of breach of the duty of loyalty frequently occur in
transactions related to corporate control when corporate managers
or controlling shareholders are perceived to have obtained an ad-
vantage at the expense of the minority or the outside owners. Ex-
amples of such transactions include defensive purchases of shares
held by a corporate raider (also known as "greenmail"), 3 the issu-
21. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928). This case was decided in
a joint venture setting. The degree of fiduciary duty the court found here has been applied
to all types of business settings, including the corporate setting. Here the plaintiff was help-
ing to finance defendants' venture, which was to reconstruct and manage property that the
defendant had leased for 20 years. The plaintiff was to receive a percentage of net profits
and bear half the losses. With less than a year to go on the initial lease, the owner of the
buildings approached the defendant with a lucrative business deal to lease the property and
others adjoining it. Defendant did so without telling the plaintiff. Plaintiff brought suit and
was awarded half the value of the new lease. The court ruled that this new lease was inci-
dent to the joint venture, and therefore defendant had a duty to tell the plaintiff about it.
Id. at 464-65, 164 N.E. at 547. The plaintiff thus received the benefit of the transaction
because it was within the scope of the joint venture.
22. See Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967). Here the defendant directors and
shareholders were involved in the purchase and sale of low-rent housing before, during, and
after the plaintiff corporation, Darand, was formed to purchase and operate low-rent hous-
ing. No discussion or agreement was made concerning Darand having the first opportunity
to buy low-rent housing that defendants found. The other shareholder brought suit because
after Darand was formed, the defendants bought low-rent housing without giving Darand
the opportunity to buy first. The court held that the directors did not breach any duty of
corporate opportunity, without more evidence of an agreement, because defendants spent
most of their time in unrelated businesses and already owned other corporations that were
holding similar property. Id. at 900. The dissent was based on the idea that a fiduciary duty
was imposed by law and prevented the defendants from selecting the best propeities for
themselves. Id. at 903 (Hays, J., dissenting).
23. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964). This is one of the early cases
approving the defensive tactic of buying out the corporate raider. The court held that this
was permitted if, in the business judgment of the directors, it was advisable as a means to
meet a challenge to corporate policy. The court stated, however, that the buy-out would be
830
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ance of shares into friendly hands for the same purpose,24 the sale
of controlling shares,25 and the granting of "poison pill" stock op-
tions to shareholders. 26
III. FIDUCIARY DUTY AMONG SHAREHOLDERS
A. In Publicly Held Corporations
Little question exists that under appropriate circumstances ma-
jority shareholders have a direct fiduciary liability to the minority.
This was established long ago by the United States Supreme Court
in Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert.2 7 In Delaware it was first deter-
mined in 1923 in Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co.
of America,28 a case involving a proposed sale of all the assets of a
corporation, and it has been followed many times since then. Prob-
ably the three best known cases today discussing the existence of
such a duty among shareholders of publicly held corporations,
however, are Zahn v. Transamerica,9 Perlman v. Feldmann,30 and
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co."l
In Zahn, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit held that Transamerica Corporation, a Delaware corporation
and the majority shareholder in control of the board of the Axton-
Fisher Corporation, a Kentucky corporation, was liable directly to
an improper expenditure of corporate funds if done for the purpose of perpetuating control.
Id. at 508, 199 A.2d at 556.
24. Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972) (funding of an "Employees
Stock Trust Plan" with corporate stock in order to get the company into friendly hands).
25. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955) (con-
trol premium held to be a corporate asset).
26. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch.), afl'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del.
1985). The "poison pill" in this case consisted of rights granted to each common share to
purchase for $10,000 per share participating preferred stock entitled to dividends and liqui-
dating preferences of 100 times the dividends and amounts receivable on liquidation of the
common stock. The rights could be exercised or sold only if certain defined takeover events
occurred. If a merger ensued thereafter, the holder of the rights could purchase common
stock of the acquiring company at a price reflecting a market value of twice the exercise
price of the rights.
27. 250 U.S. 483 (1919).
28. 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 A. 486 (1923). Accord Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278
(Del. 1977); Epstein v. Celotex Corp., 43 Del. Ch. 504, 238 A.2d 843 (1968).
29. 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
30. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
31. 1 Cal. 3d 93, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d 464 (1969).
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minority shareholders. The directors had decided to redeem the
Class A stock prior to the liquidation of the company, a move that
was within the power of the board but quite favorable to the Class
B stock, owned by Transamerica, and detrimental to the Class A
shareholders, of which Zahn was one.
The court observed:
The act of the board of directors in calling the Class A stock, an
act which could have been legally consummated by a disinter-
ested board of directors, was here effected at the direction of the
principal Class B stockholder in order to profit it. Such a call is
voidable in equity at the instance of a stockholder injured
thereby."2
The court thus held that the directors had violated their fiduciary
duty by acting intentionally to prefer the majority at the expense
of the minority.
The court did not specifically state the basis for holding the ma-
jority shareholder liable; however, it found that the directors had
breached their fiduciary duties, and it at least implied that the
controlling ,shareholder was liable for having solicited that
breach. The court recognized the control relationship that existed
between Transamerica and the Axton-Fisher directors. "[I]t will be
observed that agents or representatives of Transamerica consti-
tuted Axton-Fisher's board of directors at the times of the happen-
ing of the events complained of, and that Transamerica was Axton-
Fisher's principal and controlling stockholder at such times. '
Elsewhere in the opinion the court referred to Transamerica as
"the board of directors of Axton-Fisher, . . . its officership or...
its controlling stockholder."35 On the basis of the agency relation-
ship, one might conclude that the court found Transamerica vicari-
ously liable for the action of the captive directors. One finds this
difficult to believe, however.
Any vicarious liability imposed on Transamerica for having
solicited a breach of duty of directors would run to the corpora-
tion, Axton-Fisher, and not to the Axton-Fisher shareholders; how-
32. Zahn, 162 F.2d at 46.
33. Id. at 42.




ever, directors acting in their proper capacity invariably have been
found to have no direct fiduciary duty to shareholders.3 To hold
majority shareholders liable to shareholders for inducing directors
to breach their duty to the corporation would thus be illogical. In
such a case the injured party would be the corporation rather than
the shareholders. Solicitation of a breach of a director's duty to the
corporation was not a proper basis for finding liability. There is
another basis, however.
In Zahn the question of director liability did not arise. The di-
rectors were not even named as defendants. That suit was a class
action against the majority shareholder, Transamerica, and the
majority shareholder was found to have breached a duty it owed to
the minority. The breach by directors, however, was not the basis
of the action; rather, the basis was the breach by the majority
shareholder of its duty to the minority. Without doubt, the direc-
tors also would have been liable to the shareholders, not because of
their responsibilities as directors but because of their actions as
agents of the controlling shareholder.
In Perlman v. Feldmann37 an individual who was an officer, a
director, and the majority shareholder sold his interest in an Indi-
ana corporation to a group that this individual knew intended to
harm the corporation. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held this transfer to be a breach of the individual's
fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders.3 The majority appar-
ently found that this duty arose due to the majority shareholder's
control over the directors. Noting that the applicable Indiana law
on corporate fiduciary duties was "particularly relevant to Feld-
mann as a director," the court maintained that "the same rule
should apply to his fiduciary duties as majority stockholder, for in
that capacity he chooses and controls the directors, and thus is
held to have assumed their liability." '39
The difficulty with this statement is that the directors appar-
ently did not breach their fiduciary duty. In fact, the shareholder
breaching his duty to fellow shareholders could have, and in all
36. Id. at 42.
37. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
38. Id. at 176.
39. Id.
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likelihood did, accomplish the act complained of without the need
for any cooperation on the part of the directors. Perlman involved
a transfer of stock by a shareholder, a transaction to which the
directors and the corporation were mere bystanders. The basis for
the majority shareholder's liability, therefore, could not have been
the liability of the principal (the majority shareholder) for the acts
of his agent (the director). Here the majority shareholder acted di-
rectly, and thus the breach of duty must have arisen because the
controlling shareholder had a direct duty to the minority or to the
corporation with respect to his sale of stock. The opinion did not
discuss the basis for finding liability, as the dissent was quick to
point out.40 Judge Swan argued that as a selling shareholder, Feld-
mann was acting on his own behalf and not as a representative of
the corporation. As a result, no duty arose out of the corporate
relationship. He did observe, however, that if the selling
shareholder
knows or has reason to believe that the purchaser intends to ex-
ercise to the detriment of the corporation the power of manage-
ment acquired by the purchase, such knowledge or reasonable
suspicion will terminate the dominant shareholder's privilege to
sell and will create a duty not to transfer the power of manage-
ment to such purchaser.41
Judge Swan characterized this duty as "the obligation which every-
one is under not to assist another to commit a tort rather than the
obligation of a fiduciary. '42
Perlman has come to be known as one of the few cases in which
a controlling shareholder who sold was held liable for the "control
premium" received.43 Although not clearly articulated, inherent in
the decision is the idea that Feldmann, as controlling shareholder,
had a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders and breached
this duty by selling for personal gain a corporate asset--corporate
control.
40. "My brothers' opinion does not specify precisely what fiduciary duty Feldmann is
held to have violated or whether it was a duty imposed upon him as the dominant stock-
holder or as a director of Newport." Id. at 178 (Swan, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 179.
42. Id.
43. See Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALiF. L. REV. 1 (1956).
(Vol. 29:823
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In Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.,44 the action taken by the ma-
jority shareholders clearly involved no exercise of control in the
sense that the corporation was compelled to do anything. The ma-
jority shareholders had organized a holding company and trans-
ferred their shares to it, and then took the holding company pub-
lic, thus creating a market for their own holdings while inhibiting
the development of a market for the minority shares. Minority
shareholders were successful in a class action against the majority
shareholders. 45 Although the shares were not widely held, the court
did not seem to distinguish between close corporations and others
in reaching its decision.
As in Perlman, the corporation was made neither to do nor to
refrain from doing anything. The directors never exercised their
power to control. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that the
breach was caused by the defendants as majority shareholders
rather than as directors. The court stated:
[D]irectors and officers have an obligation to shareholders indi-
vidually not to profit from their official position at the share-
holders' expense.... The rule applies alike to officers, directors,
and controlling shareholders in the exercise of powers that are
theirs by virtue of their position and to transactions wherein
controlling shareholders seek to gain an advantage in the sale or
transfer or use of their controlling block of shares. 46
This statement, of course, is much broader than the facts of the
case will support. H.F. Ahmanson & Co. did not involve any exer-
cise by directors or officers of "powers that are theirs by virtue of
their position," unless the directors' failure to take the corporation
public was an abuse of power. As previously noted, the proposition
that directors have a direct responsibility to shareholders "by vir-
tue of their position" has little support in the cases to date. In
both Perlman and H.F. Ahmanson & Co., however, controlling
shareholders were held liable for breach of their duty to the minor-
ity. This duty evidently arose not because of an actual exercise of
their control over the corporation, but rather because they had the
44. 1 Cal. 3d 93, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d 464 (1969).
45. Id. at 101-05, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 594-97, 460 P.2d at 466-69.
46. Id. at 110, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 600-01, 460 P.2d at 472-73.
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power to control. Thus, in both Perlman and H.F. Ahmanson &
Co. liability resulted because of the defendant's status.
B. In Close Corporations
With the possible exception of H.F. Ahmanson & Co., the own-
ership of the corporations discussed in the prior section was too
widely dispersed for them to be considered close corporations.
Still, in those cases the majority shareholders were held to owe a
fiduciary responsibility that seemed to transcend the exercise of
control and be equivalent to the fiduciary duty of a partner. Many
courts have unequivocally stated that such a duty exists between
shareholders in close corporations.
In 1975 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Dona-
hue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.47 drew a distinction between the fidu-
ciary lability of a shareholder in a close corporation and that of
controlling shareholder in a more widely held corporation. The
court stated:
Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close corpora-
tion to the partnership, the trust and confidence which are es-
sential to this scale and manner of enterprise, and the inherent
danger to minority interests in the close corporation, we hold
that stockholders in the close corporation owe one another sub-
stantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enter-
prise that partners owe to one another."
The court then contrasted this "strict good faith standard with the
somewhat less stringent standard of fiduciary duty to which direc-
tors and stockholders of all corporations must adhere in the dis-
charge of their corporate responsibilities."49
47. 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
48. Id. at 592-93, 328 N.E.2d at 515 (footnotes omitted). The characteristics of a close
corporation in Massachusetts are a small number of stockholders, no ready market for the
corporate stock, and substantial majority stockholder participation in the management, di-
rection, and operations of the corporation. Id. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
49. Id. at 593-94, 328 N.E.2d at 515-16 (footnote omitted). The court also observed that
corporate directors are held to a good faith and inherent fairness standard of conduct and
are not permitted to serve two masters whose interests are antagonistic. Their paramount
duty is to the corporation, and their personal pecuniary interests are subordinate to that
duty. Id. at 594, 328 N.E.2d at 516.
[Vol. 29:823
SHAREHOLDERS' FIDUCIARY RIGHTS
The court emphasized that its reason for imposing a greater fi-
duciary duty on shareholders in a close corporation was the illi-
quidity of the shareholder's investment-one of the principal justi-
fications for the existence of such a duty among partners. The
court stated:
At this point, the true plight of the minority stockholder in a
close corporation becomes manifest. He cannot easily reclaim his
capital.... Thus, in a close corporation, the minority stockhold-
ers may be trapped in a disadvantageous situation.50
It should be emphasized that the court in this case, knowing full
well the significance of its decision, extended the concept of a fidu-
ciary duty among shareholders inter se somewhat beyond previous
bounds. The court could have limited its decision by emphasizing
that the shareholder who was alleged to have breached his fiduci-
ary duty was a member of a family group that controlled the cor-
poration; instead, it declared that all shareholders in close corpora-
tions were, in effect, partners, and had the duty of partners to one
another. The court stated, "We do not limit our holding to major-
ity stockholders. In the close corporation, the minority may do
equal damage through unscrupulous and improper 'sharp dealings'
with an unsuspecting majority. ' '51 Whether the shareholder to be
charged with a fiduciary duty to his fellow shareholder controls the
corporation apparently is not relevant. The court concluded that
all shareholders had such responsibility, even though it spoke only
of a need to protect the disadvantaged minority.52
In the Indiana case of Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp.,5"
two principal shareholders of a close corporation challenged the
validity of certain stock transactions that would have altered the
control of the corporation. The court examined the corporation
50. Id. at 591-92, 328 N.E.2d at 514-15.
51. Id. at 593 n.17, 328 N.E.2d at 515 n.17. This case was restricted specifically to close
corporations and held that the corporation was required to make proportionally identical
offers to all shareholders. Id. at 598, 328 N.E.2d at 518. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), in which a stockholder in a public issue corporation was ex-
cluded from an offer by the corporation to purchase its stock, the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware held that no fiduciary duty had been violated and that the action of the directors was
protected by the business judgment rule. Id. at 958-59.
52. Donohue, 367 Mass. at 591-92, 328 N.E.2d at 514-15.
53. 177 Ind. App. 224, 378 N.E.2d 941 (1978).
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and the two principal shareholders, found that the corporation
was, in fact, an "incorporated partnership, '54 and held that the
shareholders of. such a corporation owed a fiduciary duty to each
other.5 5 The court held that the standard of conduct shareholders
owed one another in an "incorporated partnership" was the same
as that owed by a partner-"to deal fairly, honestly and openly. ' 56
In the court's own words, "[t]he 'partnership' expectation of equal-
ity of shareholdings carried with it the duty on the part of each
principal to disclose to the other the availability of outstanding
shares for sale and to afford the opportunity to share in the
purchase of such stock. '57
In contrast, other courts have refused to recognize any fiduciary
duty of minority shareholders in a close corporation. For example,
in Johns v. Caldwell,5 ' the Tennessee Court of Appeals denied the
existence of any fiduciary duty of shareholders other than those in
control. In that case no controlling shareholder existed; therefore,
the court found no fiduciary duty.5 9 As in Cressy, the dispute con-
cerned an effort by one shareholder in a close corporation to obtain
control by acquiring additional shares from another shareholder.
Unlike in Cressy, however, the court found no duty analogous to
the duty of one partner to another.
In Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,60 the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts again considered the relationship be-
tween shareholders in a close corporation. In this case, a four-man
corporation had been organized under the laws of Massachusetts.
54. Id. at 229, 378 N.E.2d at 945. Despite an earlier opinion of the court of appeals indi-
cating that all close corporations were incorporated partnerships, Hartung v. Architects
Hartung/Odle/Burke, Inc., 157 Ind. App. 546, 553, 301 N.E. 2d 240, 243 (1973), the court in
Cressy made clear that an incorporated partnership would be recognized only when the
shareholders expected to act and intended to be treated as partners in their dealings among
themselves and no harm to outsiders resulted. 177 Ind. App. at 229, 378 N.E.2d at 945.
55. Note that the dispute did not concern the management of the corporation's affairs.
Moreover, there were no express restrictions on the transfer of the corporations' stock nor
an express agreement between the shareholders concerning stock transactions. The view ex-
pressed by the court was advocated in Conway, The New York Fiduciary Concept in Incor-
porated Partnerships and Joint Ventures, 30 FORDHAM L. REv. 297 (1961).
56. Cressy, 177 Ind. App. at 229, 378 N.E.2d at 945.
57. Id.
58. 601 S.W.2d 37 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).
59. Id. at 41-42.
60. 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
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Each shareholder was also a director and an officer. After some
years the relationship among the shareholders became strained,
and at a board of directors meeting, three of the directors estab-
lished salaries for themselves while excluding the absent director,
Wilkes. Subsequently, Wilkes was not re-elected as a director. 1
The court affirmed that majority shareholders in a close corpora-
tion owed a fiduciary duty to the minority, but maintained that
the majority had "certain rights to what has been termed 'selfish
ownership'. '6 2 The court then stated that the majority's right of
self-interest had to be balanced against the fiduciary duty owed to
the minority, and held that such a balancing of interests included a
determination of whether the minority had been denied its justifia-
ble expectations by the action of the majority, whether the major-
ity could demonstrate a "legitimate business purpose for its ac-
tion," and whether an alternative course of action was less harmful
to the minority's interests. In applying these tests, the court held
that the majority shareholders had breached their fiduciary duty to
the minority shareholder.6 4 As in Cressy, the court in Wilkes em-
phasized the parties' expectations at the time of incorpora-
tion-that each shareholder would be a director, would participate
actively in the management of the business, and would receive
equal amounts of money from the corporation.
In dicta, the courts in both Donahue and Wilkes stated that all
shareholders, not just a majority or those in control of the board of
directors, owed a fiduciary duty to their fellow shareholders.65 In
Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc.,6 the Massachusetts Court of
Appeals applied this dictum when the majority shareholders
sought protection from a minority shareholder. Atlantic Properties
had been organized under the laws of Massachusetts with four
shareholders, each owning equal amounts of stock. Both the arti-
cles of organization and the bylaws contained a provision requiring
the approval of eighty percent of the outstanding voting capital
61. Id. at 847, 353 N.E.2d at 661.
62. Id. at 850-51, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
63. Id. at 851, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
64. Id. at 852, 353 N.E.2d at 663-64.
65. Id. at 848-49, 353 N.E.2d at 662; Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 579,
587, 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (1975).
66. 12 Mass. App. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981).
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stock for any act by the board of directors or shareholders." After
a number of years of harmonious relations, ill will arose among the
shareholders. One shareholder, Dr. Wolfson, refused to vote for
any dividends despite warnings that the Internal Revenue Service
could impose a penalty for the unreasonable accumulation of cor-
porate earnings and profits. As a result of Dr. Wolfson's failure to
vote for a dividend, the corporation was penalized by the Internal
Revenue Service. 8 After reviewing Donahue and Wilkes, the Mas-
sachusetts Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision that
Dr. Wolfson breached his fiduciary duty of "utmost good faith and
loyalty" to the other shareholders.6 9
C. The Contrast Between Publicly Held and Close Corporations
The cases make it quite clear that a fiduciary relationship exists
among shareholders and is associated with control. Some of these
cases suggest that this duty is enhanced among shareholders in a
close corporation. Cases such as Donahue and Wilkes emphasize
this distinction and state that the shareholders in the close corpo-
ration have the duty of partners to each other. Smith applies this
rule to a shareholder who had only transactional rather than cor-
porate control. The distinction is not without theoretical validity.
In the close corporation, the expectations of the parties generally
are that they will participate and benefit just as if the enterprise
were a partnership, and it is this expectation, rather than the
rights of the shareholders under corporation law, that these cases
have protected. On the other hand, the expectations of the share-
holder in a publicly held corporation are generally something less
than that. In Zahn 0 and Perlman,1 the minority's rights under
67. In full, the provision read:
No election, appointment or resolution by the Stockholders and no election,
appointment, resolution, purchase, sale, lease, contract, contribution, compen-
sation, proceeding or act by the Board of Directors or by any officer or officers
shall be valid or binding upon the corporation until effected, passed, approved
or ratified by an affirmative vote of eighty (80%) per cent of the capital stock
issued outstanding and entitled to vote.
Id. at 202, 422 N.E.2d at 799.
68. Id. at 203, 422 N.E.2d at 800.
69. Id. at 209, 422 N.E.2d at 803.
70. 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
71. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
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corporation law itself were protected. That is, in both cases the
majority was found to have misappropriated a corporate as-
set-corporate control in Perlman and inventory appreciation in
Zahn. When the justifiable expectations of the shareholders in a
publicly held corporation are greater than the mere expectation to
benefit from general corporation law, such expectations should be
protected.
The difference between the protection provided minority share-
holders in close and publicly held corporations therefore appears
to arise from the expectations of the parties. In both types of cor-
porations, the controlling shareholder has a fiduciary duty to the
other shareholders not to defeat their proper expectations. In the
context of each type of enterprise, however, the expectations are
often different.
IV. THE LIABILITY OF CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS FOR BREACH
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY BY DIRECTORS
The notion that the corporation's owners, as such, owe some
duty to their creation, the corporation, is often found in the corpo-
rate literature and cases, and there is some justification for it. The
relationship among parties in a corporation is consensual, and in-
terference with that relationship by one party should be actionable
by one or more of the others. The parties are the shareholders, the
directors, the officers, and the corporation itself. If a controlling
shareholder influences a director subservient to him to act not in
the best interest of the corporation, and thus to violate his duty to
the corporation, the corporation should have a cause of action
against that shareholder based on the law of agency.
Numerous cases support the proposition that shareholders will
be held liable to their corporation for causing a director to act
against the corporate interests. Here the liability is not a direct
liability from shareholders to corporation but arises out of an
agency relationship. An example is Wright v. Heizer Corp., 2 in
which a controlling shareholder caused the directors to authorize a
pledge of corporate assets to such shareholder on unfair terms. The
72. 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
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court found the shareholder liable to the corporation in a deriva-
tive action."3
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levian7 4 was a derivative action against a
majority shareholder for breach of fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion. The court found the majority shareholder liable because it
had caused the corporation to refrain from proceeding against an-
other subsidiary of the majority shareholder for breach of contract.
The court stated, "A parent does indeed owe a fiduciary duty to its
subsidiary when there are parent-subsidiary dealings. '7 5 The court
went on to find that there had been such dealings and that the
duty had been breached.76 Here again, the shareholder was found
liable on the basis of agency law for having procured the breach of
duty by directors.
Perlman7 appears to be the only case in which shareholders
were found to have a direct rather than vicarious fiduciary duty to
their corporation, and even there the opinion does not clearly ar-
ticulate this finding. That such a duty on the part of shareholders
was found, however, can be seen from the fact that the action com-
plained of was one that was not in the power of directors, but
could be taken only by the controlling shareholder. In addition, the
action, being derivative, was brought to enforce a corporate right.
The award was made to the minority shareholders only as a matter
of convenience.
V. THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF DIRECTORS TO SHAREHOLDERS
The director is, of course, accountable to the corporation, the
entity for whose management he is responsible, for a breach of
duty.78 Many courts, however, have found directors liable to share-
holders when the director dealt as an individual with the share-
holder, and they seem to have applied a fiduciary standard in de-
termining liability. These cases generally involve the sale or
surrender by the shareholder of his stock under circumstances con-
73. Id. at 251.
74. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
75. Id. at 720.
76. Id. at 723.
77. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
78. Chenery Corp. v. SEC, 128 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 80 (1943). "[T]he
general rule is that ... directors occupy a trust relation to the corporation.... ." Id. at 307.
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stituting a breach of trust. In one such case, Sher v. Sandier,9 one
who was a director, officer, and principal shareholder was held lia-
ble for having purchased shares from another shareholder without
making adequate disclosure. The general rule, however, seems to
deny the existence of a fiduciary obligation running from the direc-
tor acting in his individual capacity to the shareholder with whom
he deals unless "special facts" exist."0 It should also be pointed out
that this rule concerns the responsibilities of directors in their in-
dividual capacities, whereas the focus of this Article is the fiduci-
ary responsibilities among the parties in a corporation acting in
their proper role.
The idea that directors acting in their proper capacity owe a
duty to shareholders is frequently encountered in the cases and the
literature. In Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard Dandini Co.,8l the
California Court of Appeal stated:
It is hornbook law that directors, while not strictly trustees, are
fiduciaries, and bear a fiduciary relationship to the corporation,
and to all the stockholders. They owe a duty to all stockholders,
including the minority stockholders, and must administer their
duties for the common benefit."'
Statements such as this are found regularly in the cases. It is not
surprising, therefore, that they are included in the opinions in the
recent Delaware decisions referred to at the beginning of this Arti-
cle. They are subject to the interpretation that in some circum-
stances the director has an individual duty to the shareholder. His-
torically, case law supporting this interpretation has been virtually
nonexistent. In those cases imposing on directors a liability run-
ning to shareholders, the directors either have been controlling
shareholders or have been acting for controlling shareholders. 3
79. 325 Mass. 348, 90 N.E.2d 536 (1950).
80. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186
N.E. 659 (1933).
81. 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952).
82. Id. at 419, 241 P.2d at 74.
83. See, e.g., Chounis v. Laing, 125 W. Va. 275, 23 S.E.2d 628 (1942). Defendants, who
were shareholders, directors, and officers, wrongfully caused the sales function of three coal
mining companies to be conveyed to a new company jointly owned by the defendants. They
also arranged an exclusive sales agreement between the new corporation and the others. The
court stated that officers and directors owed a fiduciary duty to shareholders. The court also
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On the other hand, in several cases courts have expressly denied
that directors have any specific fiduciary duty to shareholders. In
Strong v. Repide,"4 the United States Supreme Court stated that
"no relationship of a fiduciary nature exists between a director and
a shareholder in a business corporation.""5 There the Court indi-
cated that its finding of liability was based not on the defendant's
position as a director, but on his position as majority shareholder.
As majority shareholder, he owed a fiduciary duty to the remaining
shareholders in certain aspects of his exercise of control.
In SEC v. Chenery Corp.,8" the Supreme Court clearly confirmed
the rule that directors have no fiduciary liability to shareholders.
In that case, officers, directors, and controlling shareholders bought
preferred stock of a corporation in reorganization under the Hold-
ing Company Act 87 at prices lower than the book value of the
shares of a proposed successor corporation they planned to organ-
ize, without disclosing the disparity in value to the sellers of the
stock. The preferred shares were to be convertible into shares of
the new corporation. The SEC disapproved the reorganization un-
less the stock so acquired was not permitted to be ranked on a
observed that in a derivative action the recovery ordinarily should go to the corporation. In
this case, however, more than 95% of the corporation's stockholders approved a settlement
agreement making only partial restitution. The court concluded, therefore, that the award
should go directly to the plaintiffs. Id. at 297, 23 S.E.2d at 640.
In Nelms v. Weaver, 681 S.W.2d 547 (Tenn. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1118 (1986), the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that when a corporation issued shares contrary to a share-
holders' resolution granting the shareholders preemptive rights to the shares, any share-
holder could compel the corporation to rescind the improper issue. The court observed that
"officers and directors of the corporation occupy a fiduciary relationship to their sharehold-
ers, as, indeed, do majority stockholders toward minority stockholders." Id. at 549. The
plaintiff, a stockholder and president of the corporation, sought a declaratory judgment vali-
dating the issue. The court held against him on the basis that issue of the stock in question
violated his fiduciary duty, and it directed recission of the issue of shares. Id. at 550-51.
84. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
85. Id. at 431 (citing Board of Comm'rs v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509, 509-15 (1873)); see also
Farmers' & Merchants Bank v. Downey, 53 Cal. 466 (1879) (observing that officers and di-
rectors were trustees of the stockholders); Farwell v. Pyle-Nat'l Elec. Headlight Co., 289 111.
157, 124 N.E. 449, (1919) (although the stockholders lost, the court stated that the directors
were trustees for all of the stockholders); Brown v. Little, Brown & Co., 269 Mass. 102, 168
N.E. 521 (1929) (a corporation and all directors were enjoined from denying a shareholder
his rights as a holder of common stock because plaintiff's rights were individual and were
related to an attempt by the defendants to compel him to sell his stock).
86. 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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parity with other convertible preferred stock. The SEC maintained
that the purchases without adequate disclosure were a breach of
the fiduciary duty of the purchasers to the corporation and its
shareholders. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held, however, that although directors generally were trust-
ees of the corporation and of the shareholders as a group with re-
spect to the business and property of the corporation and its man-
agement, they were not trustees of the individual shareholder
because these directors had no control over the shareholder's
shares." The Supreme Court affirmed."9
Although several well-known cases have established that a fidu-
ciary responsibility runs from the director acting in his proper ca-
pacity to the shareholder, 90 these decisions are not inherently in-
consistent with Chenery Corp. or Strong. As mentioned earlier, it
is significant that in all such cases that have come to the attention
of the writer, the director either was a controlling shareholder or
was controlled by a shareholder who was favored by the action of
the director. This is true even in Remillard Brick Co., which con-
cerned directors' action at the direction of the controlling share-
holders that was detrimental to the minority. The directors in this
case may have been liable to shareholders not because of their
breach of duty as directors but because of their action as agents of
the controlling shareholder who breached his fiduciary duty to the
minority.
Recent cases interpreting Delaware law might presage a change.
The most significant is Smith v. Van Gorkom,9' in which directors
were held liable for damages directly to shareholders for failure to
exercise due care in ascertaining the best interests of shareholders
in a corporate acquisition. In its opinion, the court did not develop
any theory of liability of directors to shareholders, nor did it ac-
88. Chenery Corp. v. SEC, 128 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1942), af'd, 318 U.S. 80 (1943). One
might question the meaning of the statement, often repeated in this case and in many
others, that the directors are trustees to the shareholders as a body. This means merely that
the shareholders may compel the directors to carry out their responsibilities to the
corporation.
89. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80.
90. North Carolina has codified this relationship. A North Carolina statute provides that
"[o]fficers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation
and its stockholders." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982).
91. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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knowledge this remarkable aspect of its decision in any way. The
fact remains, however, that director liability to shareholders was
found. In this case the court did not suggest that the defendant
directors were acting as agents of controlling shareholders who
breached their duty to the other shareholders. These directors
were clearly independent, and the worst that could be said of them
is that they relied too heavily on the chairman of the board on
which they served. The court, however, held that they had
breached a direct obligation to the shareholders.92
The one basis that the court found for imposing direct liability
to shareholders on the directors apparently was the two-step
merger process provided by Delaware law93 and the laws of many
other states. This process specifies that directors "shall adopt a
resolution approving an agreement of merger" before submitting it
to shareholders for their approval.94 Implicit in the court's decision
was its understanding that this requirement placed on directors a
duty to submit to shareholders only those mergers they recom-
mended for approval. Admittedly, that was not done. The directors
recognized that they had not made an adequate determination of
the fairness of the price being offered, but they thought this could
be cured by submitting the proposition to the vote of
shareholders.9
This conclusion that the statute imposes on directors a direct
responsibility to shareholders is not unreasonable. Once this con-
clusion is accepted, it follows that directors should have the same
duties of care and loyalty in discharging this responsibility that
they have with respect to their other duties, and that they should
be protected to the same extent in the exercise of their business
judgment.
The court and the parties also seemed to recognize a duty of
directors to shareholders that transcended the Delaware merger
statute. In the merger agreement that was finally executed, the fol-
lowing clause, illustrative of the opinion of the parties, was
included:
92. Id. at 893.
93. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (1987 Interim Supp.).
94. Id.
95. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 889.
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The Board of Directors shall recommend to the stockholders of
Trans Union that they approve and adopt the Merger Agree-
ment... and to use its best efforts to obtain the requisite votes
therefor. GL acknowledges that Trans Union directors may
have a competing fiduciary obligation to the shareholders
under certain circumstances.96
The court also believed that a such fiduciary duty existed. It
gave great weight to its interpretation of the evidence that the
board did not have the right to withdraw from the agreement and
accept any higher offer received before the meeting of the share-
holders. Furthermore, the court clearly couched its decision in
terms of a violation of the duty of care,9" one aspect of fiduciary
responsibility.
Perhaps outside directors of publicly held corporations have
been enjoined from violating their fiduciary duty in the past; how-
ever, no other instance in Delaware case law can be found in which
directors have been found liable for damages to shareholders ex-
cept where the directors were acting on behalf of a controlling
shareholder, and the rationale of these findings has been explained
previously. That aspect of the decision is novel. The court cites
many cases to support other aspects of its decision, but none in
support of its finding of a direct, independent duty of directors to
shareholders.
More recent cases have begun to develop theoretical support for
the holding in Van Gorkom that under certain circumstances di-
rectors have a direct fiduciary duty to shareholders. In fact, they
might even indicate that Delaware courts are willing to find other
nonstatutory bases for imposing direct liability to shareholders. In
ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc.,98 the Supreme Court of Nebraska
determined that under Delaware law a contractual commitment
that directors would use their best efforts to effectuate a merger
would not override the fiduciary duty of directors to exercise their
business judgment for the benefit of the corporation and its stock-
holders. In this case ConAgra and the target company had entered
into a merger agreement containing a best-efforts clause that in-
96. Id. at 879 (emphasis in original).
97. Id. at 893.
98. 222 Neb. 136, 382 N.W.2d 576 (1986).
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cluded a proviso that "nothing herein contained shall relieve either
Board of Directors of their continuing duties to their respective
shareholders." 99 The target board of directors then determined not
to submit the agreement to its shareholders.100 The opinion does
not clearly state whether the individual directors were parties to
the contract, nor is this relevant, because the action was brought
against the competing offeror, Cargill, and the target rather than
the directors of the target. It seems elementary, however, that the
fiduciary duty of directors is personal and that the corporation
they serve should not be able to contract it away.
The court held that ConAgra had not committed a breach of
contract because the directors were permitted under the contract
to perform their "continuing fiduciary duty" to their respective
shareholders, and the board had the duty to advise shareholders on
the basis of its business judgment.' The court also pointed out
that absent shareholder approval the board was without power to
commit the target to a merger. The court further reasoned that
since neither the target nor its directors was prohibited by the
best-efforts clause from discharging the fiduciary duties of direc-
tors, Cargill also was not liable. 02 At most, Cargill had persuaded
the target and its directors to observe their fiduciary duties.
This interpretation of the role of the board of directors in a
merger is, consistent with that in Van Gorkom. The entire reason-
ing of the court in ConAgra is based on the assumption that direc-
tors have a fiduciary duty to shareholders in a cash-out merger,
and there is a hint that the same would be true in other cases in
which a shareholder vote was required. 03 The court made the ex-
press observation that the duties of "fidelity, good faith and pru-
dence" were applicable to a director's acts in recommending a pro-
posed merger. 04 The court then referred to the director's duty
under the Delaware Code to submit to shareholders only those
mergers recommended by the board. 0
99. Id. at 155, 382 N.W.2d at 587.
100. Id. at 152-53, 382 N.W.2d at 586.
101. Id. at 155, 382 N.W.2d at 587.
102. Id. at 153-54, 382 N.W.2d at 586.





In Moran v. Household International, Inc.,106 the adoption by
the board of directors of a defensive mechanism providing for the
issue to shareholders of certain rights in the event that a raider
obtained more than a certain percentage of Household's outstand-
ing stock was found to be valid. In reaching this conclusion, the
Delaware Supreme Court determined that the business judgment
rule was applicable to the transaction and that the directors had
established that they had adopted the Rights Plan on the basis of
their business judgment.10 7 Significantly, the court observed that
"Household did not adopt its Rights Plan during a battle with a
corporate raider, but as a preventive mechanism to ward off future
advances." 10 8 The court did not indicate the significance of this re-
mark, which leads to speculation whether the decision would have
been the same if the action had been taken in the heat of battle.
The court also observed that "when a board addresses a pending
takeover bid it has an obligation to determine whether the offer is
in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders."10, 9
This finding that a board's consideration of takeover strategy is
one of the circumstances in which directors appear to have a direct
fiduciary duty to shareholders seems to be an extension of the con-
cept derived from Van Gorkom and Cargill that directors have
such a duty in the context of a proposed merger. The court went
on to state that "in that respect a board's duty is no different from
any other responsibility it shoulders .... ,0
The accuracy of this statement is questionable. In most in-
stances, directors discharge any obligation under the business
judgment rule by a decision made in the good-faith belief that it is
in the best interest of the corporation, without regard to the inter-
ests of shareholders. With respect to a merger proposal or tender
offer, however, the court in Household International acknowledged
that the interests of the shareholders had to be considered. The
court in effect determined that shareholders' rights were not yet on
the line. The court said, however, that "when the Household Board
106. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1986).
107. Id. at 1356-57.
108. Id. at 1349.
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of Directors is faced with a tender offer and a request to redeem
the Rights, they will not be able to arbitrarily reject the offer."11'
In response to the argument that the shareholders' rights plan
would result in "a fundamental transfer of power from the stock-
holders to the directors," the court stated that the same was true
of any tender offer defense mechanism and observed that many
had been approved by Delaware courts." 2 The court seemed to
view the building of these institutional defenses as conceivably jus-
tified irrespective of any effect this process might have on the
shareholders as investors.
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,"8 Rev-
lon and its directors were enjoined from taking certain action that
would have prevented maximization of shareholder profit in a sale
of the corporation. As a defensive measure against a threatened
takeover by Pantry Pride, Inc., Revlon had authorized and issued
to shareholders rights to exchange their shares for one-year notes,
such rights to be exercisable only in the event that someone ac-
quired less than all but more than twenty percent of Revlon stock.
The rights were not exercisable by the shares that were acquired,
however. Furthermore, all rights could be redeemed by Revlon for
$0.10 each."4
Pantry Pride made a cash tender offer, and Revlon thereupon
self-tendered for and obtained approximately one-third of its out-
standing common stock in exchange for a package of securities, in-
cluding notes containing covenants limiting Revlon's ability to in-
cur new debt, sell assets, or pay dividends unless approved by
nonmanagement directors. Pantry Pride then revised its tender
offer.
Up to this point the board had acted only in a manner designed
to protect Revlon and continue it as a going concern. The court
determined that the measures taken prior to this time were consis-
tent with the directors' fiduciary duty to the corpoiation. When
Pantry Pride increased its offer, however, "it became apparent to
all that the break-up of the company was inevitable." 1 5 The court
111. Id. at 1354.
112. Id.
113. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
114. Id. at 177.
115. Id. at 182.
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observed that "the directors' role changed from defenders of the
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best
price for the stockholders at a sale of the company." 1 6 The court
evaluated the actions of Revlon directors after this time and found
that they had engaged in "selective dealing" to fend off Pantry
Pride, whereas "obtaining the highest price for the benefit of the
stockholders should have been the central theme guiding director
action.''1117
The court thus found that in these special circumstances the di-
rectors did indeed have a direct obligation to shareholders, an obli-
gation in which the corporation itself really had no interest.1 8 Per-
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. One curious aspect of the Revlon decision is the fact that although the Chancery
Court found that Revlon directors had breached a duty of loyalty they owed to sharehold-
ers, the Supreme Court of Delaware concluded that it was a breach of the duty of care.
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 175 ("the Court of Chancery found that the Revlon directors had
breached their duty of care"). This is emphatically not the case. The Chancery Court specif-
ically found a breach of duty of loyalty. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon,
Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250 (Del. Ch. 1985). It mentioned the duty of loyalty twice and later
twice referred to the "fiduciary duty" of the board. Id. at 1250-51. The lower court made no
other mention of fiduciary duties of any kind.
After originally characterizing the Chancery Court decision as one based on breach of the
duty of care, the Delaware Supreme Court then stated, "[The trial court concluded that
Revlon directors had breached their duty of loyalty.. ." 506 A.2d at 179. The court finally
concluded, without analysis, that the directors had breached a duty of care. Id. at 185.
This conclusion is a double enigma. The inconsistent characterization of the basis of the
decision of the Chancery Court and the unreasoned manner in which the Supreme Court
approached the subject are puzzling. Furthermore, the facts of the case do not support a
finding of a breach of the duty of care, and the court cites none. It is clear that the Revlon
directors made a well-informed decision. The Chancery Court opinion contains the following
observation: "The board may have been informed, but its performance did not conform to
the other component of the business judgment rule-the duty of loyalty." 501 A.2d 1250.
Could the court have had a policy reason for its decision to broaden the concept of the duty
of care and to narrow the concept of the duty of loyalty?
In Revlon, the distinction between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty was of no
significance. In the future, however, this distinction could be of great significance in an ac-
tion for damages against directors in a context such as the attempted takeover of Revlon,
and perhaps the court was aware of that. On June 10, 1986, three months after the Revlon
decision, a bill introduced in the Delaware legislature proposed to amend § 102 of the Dela-
ware General Corporation Law to permit Delaware corporations to adopt by amendment to
the certificate of incorporation a provision "eliminating or limiting the personal liabilities of
a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages" for what can safely
be paraphrased as the good-faith breach of the duty of care. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
102(b)(7) (1988). This bill reportedly was a reaction to the decision in Van Gorkom, in
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haps it can be said that the status of directors changed from the
sui generis position the law accords directors to one of agency or
trusteeship, in which the directors were acting as and were in fact
agents or trustees of the shareholders.
One wonders whether directors in such circumstances would be
found to have all the duties of a trustee or an agent. If so, they
would be liable directly to the shareholders and for the first time a
rational basis would exist for supporting the common expression
that directors have a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its
shareholders.
The concept of such a relationship between the directors of a
publicly held corporation and its shareholder would work a
profound change in the law. For example, in the face of such a
concept, a privately negotiated side benefit by a director of a
merged corporation would have to be given over to shareholders.
Furthermore, the director unquestionably would be required to
disclose to shareholders all information concerning asset valuations
or prior negotiations for the merger or sale of the company. Also,
complaining shareholders would be able to proceed directly against
directors, thus avoiding the procedural impediments associated
with a derivative action. At present, the theory of director agency
or trustee liability to shareholders in negotiations for the sale or
merger of a corporation is only suggested in Revlon, but it appears
to be the theory that was applied in Van Gorkom. Its further de-
velopment, if any, will be watched with interest." 9
which directors were found liable in damages to shareholders for such a breach. The bill
passed both houses promptly and was signed into law by the governor on June 18, 1986.
119. Delaware courts continue to cast the shadow of change on this area. In the recent
case of In re Anderson (Clayton Shareholders' Litigation), 519 A.2d 669 (Del. Ch. 1986), the
court stated:
First, and most importantly, the question whether shareholders have, under
the circumstances, been provided with appropriate information upon which an
informed choice on a matter of fundamental corporate importance may be
made, is not a decision concerning the management of the business and affairs
of the enterprise ... of the kind the business judgment rule is intended to
protect; it is rather a matter relating to the directors' duty to shareholders who
are technically outside of the corporation.
Id. at 675. Here the court again articulates the idea that in a circumstance involving a po-
tential sale of the corporation, directors have a direct obligation to shareholders, rather than




It is reasonably clear from the cases that a shareholder exercis-
ing control is, to the extent of that control, a fiduciary to the other
shareholders, and that he, as well as directors who do his bidding,
are liable to other shareholders for breach of that duty. This impo-
sition of fiduciary duty is justified by the fact that when sharehold-
ers exercise such control, the organization is no longer being man-
aged according to the traditional concept of a corporation. As a
consequence, the law applicable to corporate management is no
longer relevant. Instead, relevant law is either trust law or that
which would normally govern the relations of two or more persons
associating directly in business-the law of agency.
Courts have much precedent in corporate law justifying their
disregard of the corporate fiction in those instances in which the
parties themselves do so, and it would seem that the principles de-
veloped in such cases should also be applicable to the cases dis-
cussed earlier in this Article. In each such case, the assessment of
liability against the controlling shareholder in favor of the minority
can be justified on the basis that the controlling shareholder occu-
pied a position analogous to that of a partner, and as such was the
agent in control of the business and had all the duties of an agent
to the other shareholders.
There is also little question that where the controlling share-
holders cause directors to breach their fiduciary duty to their cor-
poration, they are liable to their corporation for having procured
that breach. In such a case the offending shareholders have inter-
fered with the justifiable expectations of parties to a consensual
relationship.
As to the rights of shareholders versus directors, it was said more
than fifty years ago that "[a]ny fair statement of the law would
have to be based on the theory that the fiduciary duties of the
director were limited to the corporation. ' 120 Apparently, until re-
cently that assessment has continued to be true in spite of the lip
service paid to the duty of directors to shareholders. Recent inter-
pretations of Delaware law, however, indicate a change when the
director steps outside his traditional role of management oversight
120. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 226 (1932).
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and takes action directly affecting the shareholder. The making,
soliciting, or discouraging of offers for a shareholder's interest is
certainly such a circumstance.
